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Abstract—Reinforcement learning has significant applications
for multi-agent systems, especially in unknown dynamic en-
vironments. However, most multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL) algorithms suffer from such problems as exponential
computation complexity in the joint state-action space, which
makes it difficult to scale up to realistic multi-agent problems.
In this paper, a novel algorithm named negotiation-based MARL
with sparse interactions (NegoSI) is presented. In contrast to
traditional sparse-interaction based MARL algorithms, NegoSI
adopts the equilibrium concept and makes it possible for agents
to select the non-strict Equilibrium Dominating Strategy Profile
(non-strict EDSP) or Meta equilibrium for their joint actions.
The presented NegoSI algorithm consists of four parts: the
equilibrium-based framework for sparse interactions, the nego-
tiation for the equilibrium set, the minimum variance method
for selecting one joint action and the knowledge transfer of
local Q-values. In this integrated algorithm, three techniques,
i.e., unshared value functions, equilibrium solutions and sparse
interactions are adopted to achieve privacy protection, better
coordination and lower computational complexity, respectively.
To evaluate the performance of the presented NegoSI algo-
rithm, two groups of experiments are carried out regarding
three criteria: steps of each episode (SEE), rewards of each
episode (REE) and average runtime (AR). The first group of
experiments is conducted using six grid world games and shows
fast convergence and high scalability of the presented algorithm.
Then in the second group of experiments NegoSI is applied to an
intelligent warehouse problem and simulated results demonstrate
the effectiveness of the presented NegoSI algorithm compared
with other state-of-the-art MARL algorithms.
Index Terms—Knowledge transfer, multi-agent reinforcement
learning, negotiation, sparse interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent learning is drawing more and more interests
from scientists and engineers in multi-agent systems (MAS)
and machine learning communities [1]-[4]. One key technique
for multi-agent learning is multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL), which is an extension of reinforcement learning in
multi-agent domain [5]. Several mathematical models have
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been built as frameworks of MARL, such as Markov games
(MG) [6] and decentralized sparse-interaction Markov decision
processes (Dec-SIMDP) [7]. Markov games are based on the
assumption of full observability of all agents in the entire
joint state-action space. Several well-known equilibrium-based
MARL algorithms [6]-[12] are derived from this model. Dec-
SIMDP based algorithms rely on agents’ local observation,
i.e., the individual state and action. Agents in Dec-SIMDP
are modeled with single-agent MDP when they are outside
of the interaction areas, while the multi-agent model such as
MG is used when they are inside. Typical Dec-SIMDP based
algorithms include LoC [13] and CQ-learning [14]. Besides,
other models such as learning automata [2] [15] are also
valuable tools for designing MARL algorithms.
In spite of the rapid development of MARL theories and
algorithms, more efforts are needed for practical applications
of MARL when compared with other MAS techniques [16]-
[18] due to some limitations of the existing MARL methods.
The equilibrium-based MARL relies on the tightly coupled
learning process which hinders their applications in practice.
Calculating the equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium [19]) for
each time step and all joint states are computationally ex-
pensive [8], even for relatively small scale environments with
two or three agents. In addition, sharing individual states,
individual actions or even value functions all the time with
other agents is unrealistic in some distributed domains (e.g.,
streaming processing systems [20], sensor networks [21])
given the agents’ privacy protections and huge real-time com-
munication costs [1]. As for MARL with sparse interactions,
agents in this setting have no concept of equilibrium policy
and they tend to act aggressively towards their goals, which
results in a high probability of collisions.
Therefore, in this paper we focus on how the equilibrium
mechanism can be used in sparse-interaction based algo-
rithms and a negotiation-based MARL algorithm with sparse
interactions (NegoSI) is proposed for multi-agent systems
in unknown dynamic environments. The NegoSI algorithm
consists of four parts: the equilibrium-based framework for
sparse interactions, the negotiation for the equilibrium set,
the minimum variance method for selecting one joint action
and the knowledge transfer of local Q-values. Firstly, we start
with the proposed algorithm based on the MDP model and the
assumption that the agents have already obtained the single-
agent optimal policy before learning in multi-agent settings.
Then, the agents negotiate for pure strategy profiles as their
potential set for the joint action at the “coordination state” and
they use the minimum variance method to select the relatively
good one. After that, the agents move to the next joint state
and receive immediate rewards. Finally, the agents’ Q-values
are updated by their rewards and equilibrium utilities. When
2initializing the Q-value for the expanded “coordination state”,
the agents with NegoSI utilize both of the environmental infor-
mation and the prior-trained coordinated Q-values. To test the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, several benchmarks
are adopted to demonstrate the performances in terms of
the convergence, scalability, fairness and coordination ability.
In addition, aiming at solving realistic MARL problems,
the presented NegoSI algorithm is also further tested on an
intelligent warehouse simulation platform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the basic MARL theory and the MAS with sparse
interactions. In Section III, the negotiation-based MARL al-
gorithm with sparse interactions (NegoSI) is presented in
details and related issues are discussed. Experimental results
are shown in Section IV. Conclusions are given in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, some important concepts in multi-agent
reinforcement learning and typical sparse-interaction based
MARL algorithms are introduced.
A. MDP and Markov Games
We start with reviewing two standard decision-making
models that are relevant to our work, i.e., Markov decision
process (MDP) and Markov Games, respectively. MDP is the
foundation of Markov Games, while Markov Games adopt
game theory in multi-agent MDPs. MDP describes a sequential
decision problem as follows [22]:
Definition 1: (Markov Decision Process, MDP) An MDP
is a tuple 〈S,A,R,T 〉, where S is the state space, A is the
action space of the agent, R : S×A→R is the reward function
mapping state-action pairs to rewards, T : S×A×S → [0,1] is
the transition function.
An agent in an MDP is required to find an optimal policy
which maximizes some reward-based optimization criteria,
such as expected discounted sum of rewards:
V ∗(s) = max
pi
Epi{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k|st = s}, (1)
where V ∗(s) stands for the value of a state s under the optimal
policy, pi : S×A→ [0,1] stands for the policy of an agent, Epi is
the expectation under policy pi , t is any time step, k represents
a future time step, rt+k denotes the reward at the time step
(t + k) and γ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter called the discount factor.
This goal can also be equivalently described using the Q-value
for a state-action pair:
Q∗(s,a) = r(s,a)+ γ ∑
s′
T (s,a,s′)max
a′
Q∗(s′,a′), (2)
where Q∗(s,a) stands for the value of a state-action pair (s,a)
under the optimal policy, s′ is the next state and r(s,a) is
the immediate reward when agent adopts the action a at the
state s, T (s,a,s′) is the transition possibility for the agent to
transit from s to s′ given action a. One classic RL algorithm
for estimating Q∗(s,a) is Q-learning [23], whose one-step
updating rule is as follows:
Q(s,a)← (1−α)Q(s,a)+α[r(s,a)+ γ max
a′
Q(s′,a′)], (3)
where Q(s,a) denotes the state-action value function at a state-
action pair (s,a) and α ∈ [0,1] is a parameter called the
learning rate. Provided that all state-action pairs are visited
infinite times with a reasonable learning rate, the estimated
Q-value Q(s,a) converges to Q∗(s,a) [24].
Markov games are widely adopted as a framework for multi-
agent reinforcement learning (MARL) [6] [10]. It is regarded
as multiple MDPs in which the transition probabilities and
rewards depend on the joint state-action pairs of all agents. In a
certain state, agents’ individual action sets generate a repeated
game that could be solved in a game-theoretic way. Therefore,
Markov game is a richer framework which generalizes both
of the MDP and the repeated game [25]-[27].
Definition 2: (Markov game) An n-agent (n≥ 2) Markov
game is a tuple 〈n,{Si}i=1,...,n,{Ai}i=1,...,n,{Ri}i=1,...,n,T 〉,
where n is the number of agents in the system, Si is the set
of the state space for ith agent, S = {Si}i=1,...,n is the set of
state spaces for all agents, Ai is the set of the action space
for ith agent, A = {Ai}i=1,...,n is the set of action spaces for
all agents, Ri : S×A → R is the reward function of agent i,
T : S×A× S→ [0,1] is the transition function.
Denote the individual policy of agent i by pii = S×Ai →
[0,1] and the joint policy of all agents by pi = (pi1, . . . ,pin).
The Q-value of the join state-action pair for agent i under the
joint policy pi can be formulated by
Qpii (~s,~a) = Epi{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+ki |~st =~s,~at =~a}, (4)
where~s∈ S stands for a joint state, ~a∈ A for a joint action and
rt+ki is the reward received at the time step (t +k). Unlike the
optimization goal in an MDP, the objective of a Markov game
is to find an equilibrium joint policy pi rather than an optimal
joint policy for all agents. Here, the equilibrium policy concept
is usually transferred to finding the equilibrium solution for the
one-shot game played in each joint state of a Markov game
[8]. Several equilibrium-based MARL algorithms in existing
literatures such as NashQ [10] [28] and NegoQ [8] have been
proposed, so that the joint state-action pair Q-value can be
updated according to the equilibrium:
Qi(~s,~a)← (1−α)Qi(~s,~a)+α(ri(~s,~a)+ γφi(~s′))), (5)
where φi(~s′) denotes the expected value of the equilibrium in
the next joint state ~s′ for agent i and can be calculated in the
one-shot game at that joint state.
B. MAS with Sparse Interactions
The definition of Markov game reveals that all agents need
to learn their policies in the full joint state-action space and
they are coupled with each other all the time [10] [29]. How-
ever, this assumption does not hold in practice. The truth is
that the learning agents in many practical multi-agent systems
are loosely coupled with some limited interactions in some
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Fig. 1: A part of an intelligent warehouse with three robots, where
Ri (i = 1,2,3) represents for robot i with its corresponding goal Gi
and the shaded grids are storage shelves.
particular areas [5] [13] [29]. Meanwhile, the interactions
between agents may not always involve all the agents. These
facts lead to a new mechanism of sparse interactions for
MARL research.
Sparse-interaction based algorithms [13] [14] have recently
found wide applications in MAS research. An example of
MAS with sparse interactions is the intelligent warehouse
systems, where autonomous robots only consider other robots
when they are close enough to each other [25] (see Fig. 1),
i.e., when they meet around the crossroad. Otherwise, they can
act independently.
Earlier works such as the coordinated reinforcement learn-
ing [30] [31] and sparse cooperative Q-learning [32] used
coordination graphs (CGs) to learn interdependencies between
agents and decomposed the joint value function to local value
functions. However, these algorithms cannot learn CGs online
and only focus on finding specific states where coordination is
necessary instead of learning for coordination [13]. Melo and
Veloso [13] extended the Q-learning to a two-layer algorithm
and made it possible for agents to use an additional COORDI-
NATE action to determine the state when the coordination was
necessary. Hauwere and Vrancx proposed Coordinating Q-
learning (CQ-learning) [14] and FCQ-learning [33] that helped
agents learn from statistical information of rewards and Q-
values where an agent should take other agents’ states into
account. However, all these algorithms allow agents to play
greedy strategies at a certain joint state rather than equilibrium
strategies, which might cause conflicts.
More recently, Hu et al [8] proposed an efficient
equilibrium-based MARL method, called Negotiation-based
Q-learning, by which agents can learn in a Markov game with
unshared value functions and unshared joint state-actions. In
later work, they applied this method for sparse interactions
by knowledge transfer and game abstraction [29], and demon-
strated the effectiveness of the equilibrium-based MARL in
solving sparse-interaction problems. Nevertheless, as opposed
to single Q-learning based approaches like CQ-learning, Hu’s
equilibrium-based methods for sparse interactions require a
great deal of real-time information about the joint states
and joint actions of all the agents, which results in huge
amount of communication costs. In this paper, we focus
on solving learning problems in complex systems. Tightly
coupled equilibrium-based MARL methods discussed above
are impractical in these situations while sparse-interaction
based algorithms tend to cause many collisions. To this end,
we adopt the sparse-interaction based learning framework and
each agent selects equilibrium joint actions when they are in
coordination areas.
III. NEGOTIATION-BASED MARL WITH SPARSE
INTERACTIONS
When people work in restricted environments with possible
conflicts, they usually learn how to finish their individual
tasks first and then learn how to coordinate with others. We
apply this commonsense to our sparse-interaction method and
decompose the learning process into two distinct sub-processes
[5]. First, each agent learns an optimal single-agent policy by
itself in the static environment and ignores the existences of
other agents. Second, each agent learns when to coordinate
with others according to their immediate reward changes, and
then learns how to coordinate with others in a game-theoretic
way. In this section, the negotiation-based framework for MAS
with sparse interactions is first introduced and then related
techniques and specific algorithms are described in details.
A. Negotiation-based Framework for Sparse Interactions
We assume that agents have learnt their optimal policies and
reward models when acting individually in the environment.
Two situations might occur when agents are working in a
multi-agent setting. If the received immediate rewards for
state-action pairs are the same as what they learned by reward
models, the agents act independently. Otherwise, they need to
expand their individual state-action pairs to the joint ones by
adding other agents’ state-action pairs for better coordination.
This negotiation-based framework for sparse interactions is
given as shown in Algorithm 1, while the expansion and
negotiation process is explained as follows:
1) Broadcast joint state. Agents select an action at a certain
state, and they detect a change in the immediate rewards.
This state-action pair is marked as “dangerous” and
these agents are called “coordinating agents”. Then,
“coordinating agents” broadcast their state-action infor-
mation to all other agents and receive corresponding
state-action information from others. These state-action
pairs with reward changes form a joint state-action and
is marked as a “coordination pair”. Also, these states
form a joint state called a “coordination state”, which is
included in the state space of each “coordinating agent”.
2) Negotiation for equilibrium policy. When agents select a
“dangerous” state-action pair, they broadcast their state-
action information to each other to determine whether
they are staying at a “coordination pair”. If so, the
agents need to find an equilibrium policy rather than
their inherent greedy policies to avoid collisions. We
propose a negotiation mechanism similar to the work in
[8] to find this equilibrium policy. Each “coordinating
4agent” broadcasts the set of strategy profiles that are
potential Non-strict Equilibrium-Dominating Strategy
Profile (non-strict EDSP) according to its own utilities
(See Algorithm 2). If no non-strict EDSP is found, the
agents search for a Meta equilibrium set (See Algorithm
3) instead, which is always nonempty [8]. Then, if there
are several candidates in the equilibrium set, the agents
use the minimum variance method to find the relatively
good one (See Algorithm 4).
3) When an agent selects an action at a certain state, if
neither a change in the immediate reward nor a “dan-
gerous” state-action pair is detected, the agent continue
to select its action independently.
Remark 1: If the number of agents n≥ 2, the agents may
have several different expansions for different “coordination
states” in one state. Each expanded joint-state is assigned an
index and has a corresponding local Q-value. Once the agents
form a “coordination state”, they search for the joint state in
their expanded joint-state pool and obtain the corresponding
local Q-value. An example is shown as in Fig. 2. In this
example, agent 1-4 have twelve states, four states, five states
and three states, respectively. For convenience, we assume
here when agent 1 is expanding joint states, it adds all states
of relevant agents in its joint states even though in most of
the cases it only needs to add a small part of the states.
Specifically, the fourth state of agent 1 is expanded to two
joint states, the first one is with agent 4 and the second one
is with agent 2 and agent 4. Similarly, the fifth state of agent
1 is expanded to three joint states, the first one is with agent
2, the second one is with agent 2 and agent 3, and the third
one is with agent 3.
Remark 2: Owing to the broadcast mechanism, an agent
will add the states of all the “coordinating agents” to its state
space, even though it does not need to coordinate with some
of these agents. The agents cannot distinguish the agent they
need to coordinate with from other agents, which brings un-
necessary calculations. This problem becomes more significant
with the growth of the complexity of the environment and
the number of the agents. Our tentative solution is setting
the communication range of the agents so that they can only
add neighbouring agents’ states to their state space and ignore
those that do not need to coordinate with.
Remark 3: It is worth noting that if the agent detects
a “dangerous” state-action pair, it should observe a reward
change, that is, if we replace the former concept with the latter
one, the algorithm can work equally. Defining dangerous state-
action pairs mainly help us to better explain our thoughts and
describe the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Negotiation-based Framework for Sparse Interactions
Input: The agent i, state space Si, action space Ai, learning rate α , discount rate γ , exploration factor ε for the ε −Greedy
exploration policy.
Initialize: Global Q-value Qi with optimal single-agent policy.
1: for each episode do
2: Initialize state si;
3: while true do
4: Select ai ∈ Ai from Qi with ε −Greedy;
5: if (si,ai) is “dangerous” then
6: Broadcasts (si,ai) and receives (s−i,a−i), form (~s,~a);
/* See Section III-D for the definitions of s−i and a−i*/
7: if (~s,~a) is not “coordination pair” then
8: Mark (~s,~a) as a “coordination pair” and ~s as a “coordination state”, initialize Local Q-value QJi at ~s with transfer
knowledge (See Equation 9);
9: end if
10: Negotiate for the equilibrium joint action with Algorithm 2 - Algorithm 4. Select new ~a with ε −Greedy;
11: else {detected an immediate reward change}
12: Mark (si,ai) as “dangerous”, broadcasts (si,ai) and receives (s−i,a−i), form (~s,~a);
13: Mark (~s,~a) as “coordination pair” and ~s as “coordination state”, initialize QJi at ~s with transfer knowledge (See
Equation 9);
14: Negotiate for the equilibrium joint action with Algorithm 2 - Algorithm 4. Select new ~a with ε −Greedy;
15: end if
16: Move to the next state s′i and receive the reward ri;
17: if ~s exists then
18: Update QJi (~s,~a) = (1−α)QJi (~s,~a)+α(ri + γ max
a′i
Qi(s′i,a′i));
19: end if
20: Update Qi(si,ai) = (1−α)Qi(si,ai)+α(ri + γ max
a′i
Qi(s′i,a′i));
21: si ← s′i;
22: end while until si is a terminal state.
23: end for
5Expanded state space of
agent 2 and agent 4
agent 2 and agent 3
5-4-1    5-4-2   5-4-3   5-4-4    5-4-5
5-3-1    5-3-2   5-3-3   5-3-4    5-3-5
5-2-1    5-2-2   5-2-3   5-2-4    5-2-5
5-1-1    5-1-2   5-1-3   5-1-4    5-1-5Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 2
Agent 4
2
1
3
2
1
4-4-1   4-4-2    4-4-3
4-3-1    4-3-2   4-3-3
4-2-1   4-2-2   4-2-3
4-1-1   4-1-2   4-1-3
5-1   5-2    5-3   5-4    5-5
4-1   4-2   4-3
5-1   5-2   5-3   5-4 
Expanded state space of agent 4
Expanded state space of agent 3
Expanded state space of
Expanded state space of agent 2
State space of agent 1
 9       10      11       12
 5         6        7         8
 1         2        3         4
Fig. 2: An example of the expansion of an agent’s state space.
B. Negotiation for Equilibrium Set
One contribution of this paper is to apply the equilibrium
solution concept to traditional Q-learning based MARL algo-
rithms. Different from previous work like CQ-learning and
Learning of Coordination [14], our approach aims at finding
the equilibrium solution for the one-shot game played in
each “coordination state”. As a result, we focus on two pure
strategy profiles [8], i.e., Non-strict Equilibrium-Dominating
Strategy Profile (non-strict EDSP) and Meta Equilibrium set.
The definition of Non-strict EDSP is as follows.
Definition 3: (Non-strict EDSP): In an n-agent (n ≥ 2)
normal-form game Γ, ~ei ∈ A(i = 1,2, . . . ,m) are pure strategy
Nash equilibriums. A joint action ~a ∈ A is a non-strict EDSP
if ∀ j ≤ n,
U j(~a)≥ min
i
U j(~ei) (6)
The negotiation process of finding the set of Non-strict
EDSP is shown as in Algorithm 2, which generally consists of
two steps: 1) the agents find the set of strategy profiles that are
potentially Non-strict EDSP according to their individual util-
ities; 2) the agents solve the intersection of all the potentially
strategy sets and get the Non-strict EDSP set.
However, given the fact that the pure strategy Nash equi-
librium can be non-existent in some cases, the set of Non-
strict EDSP might also be empty. On this occasion, we replace
this strategy profile with Meta Equilibrium, which is always
nonempty. The sufficient and necessary condition of Meta
Equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 4: (Sufficient and Necessary Condition of
Meta Equilibrium) [8]: In an n-agent (n ≥ 2) normal-form
game Γ, a joint action ~a is called a Meta equilibrium from
a metagame k1k2 . . .krΓ if and only if for any i there holds
Ui(~a)≥ min
~aPi
max
ai
min
~aSi
Ui(~aPi ,ai, ~aSi), (7)
where Pi is the set of agents listed before sign i in the prefix
k1k2 . . .kr, Si is the set of agents listed after sign i in the prefix.
For example, in a three agents metagame 213Γ, we have
P1 = {2},S1 = {3};P2 = /0,S2 = {1,3};P3 = {2,1},S3 = /0. A
Meta equilibrium ~a meets the following constraints:
U1(~a)≥ min
a2
max
a1
min
a3
U1(a1,a2,a3),
U2(~a)≥ max
a2
min
a1
min
a3
U2(a1,a2,a3),
U3(~a)≥ min
a2
min
a1
max
a3
U3(a1,a2,a3).
(8)
Hu et al [8] used a negotiation-based method to find Meta
Equilibrium set and we simplified the method as shown in
Algorithm 3. It is also pointed out that both of these two
strategy profiles belong to the set of symmetric meta equilib-
rium, which to some degree strengthens the convergence of
the algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Negotiation for Non-strict EDSPs Set
Input: A normal-form game 〈n,{Ai}i=1,...,n,{Ui}i=1,...,n〉.
/* To be noted, “coordinating agent” i only has the
knowledge of n, {Ai}i=1,...,n and Ui*/
Initialize: The set of non-strict EDSP candidates for “coor-
dinating agents” i: JiNS ← /0;
Minimum utility value of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PNE) candidates for “coordinating agents” i: MinU iPNE ←
∞;
The set of non-strict EDSPs: JNS ← /0.
1: for each ~a−i ∈ A−i do
2: if max
a′i
Ui(a′i, ~a−i)< MinU iPNE then
3: MinU iPNE = max
a′i
Ui(a′i, ~a−i);
4: end if
5: end for
6: for each ~a ∈ A do
7: if Ui(~a)≥ MinU iPNE then
8: JiNS ← JiNS ∪{~a};
9: end if
10: end for
/* Broadcast JiNS and corresponding utilities*/
11: JNS ←
⋂n
i=1 JiNS
6C. Minimum Variance Method
In Section III-B, we presented the process for all “coordi-
nating agents” to negotiate for an equilibrium joint-action set.
However, the obtained set usually contains many strategy pro-
files and it is difficult for the agents to choose an appropriate
one. In this paper a Minimum Variance method is proposed
to help the “coordinating agents” choose the joint action with
relatively high total utility and minimum utilities variance to
guarantee the cooperation and fairness of the learning process.
In addition, if the equilibrium set is nonempty, the best solution
defined in the minimum variance method always exists. The
minimum variance method is described in Algorithm 4.
After negotiating for one equilibrium, the agents update
their states according to the joint action and receive immediate
rewards, which are used to update local Q-values as well
as global Q-values. Unlike other sparse-interaction algorithms
(e.g., CQ-learning), we update the global optimal Q-values to
avoid possible misleading information. In fact, in some cases,
the selected policies in multi-agent setting are totally opposite
to the agents’ individual optimal policies due to dynamic
coordinating processes. The whole negotiation-based learning
algorithm has already been given in Algorithm 1.
D. Local Q-value transfer
At the beginning of the learning process, we use the transfer
knowledge of agents’ optimal single agent policy to accelerate
the learning process. Furthermore, it is possible to improve
the algorithm performance by the local Q-value transfer. In
most previous literatures [13] [14], the initial local Q-values
of the newly expanded joint states are zeros. Recently, Vrancx
et al proposed a transfer learning method [34] to initialize
these Q-values with prior trained Q-value from the source
task, which is reasonable in the real world. When people
meet with others on the way to their individual destinations,
Algorithm 3 Negotiation for Meta Equilibrium Set for 3-agent
games
Input: A normal-form game < n,{Ai}i=1,...,n,{Ui}i=1,...,n >.
/* To be noted, “coordinating agents” i only has the
knowledge of n, {Ai}i=1,...,n and Ui*/
Initialize: The set of Meta Equilibrium candidates for “co-
ordinating agents” i: JiMetaE ← /0;
Minimum utility value of Meta Equilibrium candidates for
“coordinating agents” i: MinU iMetaE ← ∞;
The set of Meta Equilibrium: JMetaE ← /0;
1: Randomly initialize the prefix s1s2s3 from the set
{123,132,213,231,312,321}.
2: Calculate MinU iMetaE according to Equation 7;
3: for each ~a ∈ A do
4: if Ui(~a)≥ MinU iMetaE then
5: JiMetaE ← JiMetaE ∪{~a};
6: end if
7: end for
/* Broadcast JiMetaE and corresponding utilities*/
8: JMetaE ←
⋂n
i=1 JiMetaE
Algorithm 4 Minimum Variance Method
Input: The equilibrium set with m elements JNS =
{ ~a1ns,
~a2ns, . . . , ~a
m
ns} and corresponding utilities {Unsi }i=1,...,n.
Initialize: threshold value for total utility τ;
/* We set the threshold value to the mean value of the sum
utilities of different joint-action profiles ∑
m
j=1 ∑ni=1 Unsi (
~
a
j
ns)
m
*/
Minimum variance of these equilibriums MinV ← ∞;
Best equilibrium of the non-strict EDSPs set JBestNS ← /0.
1: for each ~a jns ∈ JNS do
2: if ∑ni=1 Unsi ( ~a jns)< τ then
3: JNS ← JNS\{
~
a
j
ns};
4: end if
5: end for
/* Minimize the joint action’s utility variance*/
6: for each ~a jns ∈ JNS do
7: if
√
1
n ∑nk=1[Unsk (
~
a
j
ns)−
1
n ∑ni=1 Unsi (
~
a
j
ns)]2 < MinV then
8: MinV =
√
1
n ∑nk=1[Unsk (
~
a
j
ns)−
1
n ∑ni=1 Unsi (
~
a
j
ns)]2;
9: JBestNS = {
~
a
j
ns};
10: end if
11: end for
12: Output JBestNS as the adopted joint action.
they usually have prior knowledge of how to avoid collisions.
Based on this prior commonsense and the knowledge of how
to finish their individual tasks, the agents learn to negotiate
with others and obtain fixed coordination strategies suitable
for certain environments. However, Vrancx et al only used
coordination knowledge to initialize the local Q-values and
overlooked the environmental information, which was proved
to be less effective in our experiments. In our approach, we
initialize the local Q-values of newly detected “coordination”
to hybrid knowledge as follows:
QJi ((si, ~s−i),(ai, ~a−i))← Qi(si,ai)+QCTi (~s,~a), (9)
where ~s−i is the joint-state set except for the state si
and ~a−i is the joint-action set except for the action ai,
QJi ((si, ~s−i),(ai, ~a−i)) is equal with QJi (~s,~a), QCTi (~s,~a) is the
transferred Q-value from a blank source task at joint state
~s. In this blank source task, joint action learners (JAL) [35]
learn to coordinate with others disregarding the environmental
information. They are given a fixed number of learning steps to
learn stable Q-value QCTi (~s,~a). Similar to [34], the joint state
~s in QCTi (~s,~a) is presented as the relative position (∆x,∆y),
horizontally and vertically. When agents attempt to move into
the same grid location or their previous locations (as shown in
Fig. 3), these agents receive a penalty of -10. In other cases,
the reward is zero.
Take a two-agent source task for example (as shown in Fig.
4(a)). The locations of agent 1 and agent 2 are (4,3) and (3,4),
respectively. Then we have the joint state ~s = (x1 − x2,y1 −
7y2) = (1,−1) and the joint action for this joint state
~a =
(
(a1,a2)
)
=


(↑,↑) (↑,↓) (↑,←) (↑,→)
(↓,↑) (↓,↓) (↓,←) (↓,→)
(←,↑) (←,↓) (←,←) (←,→)
(→,↑) (→,↓) (→,←) (→,→)

 ,
where {↑,↓,←,→} denotes the action set of {up, down, left,
right} for each agent. After sufficient learning steps, the agents
learn their Q-value matrices at joint state ~s as
QCT1 (~s, ·) = QCT2 (~s, ·) =


0 0 −10 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 −10 0 0

 ,
that is because when agent 1 and agent 2 select the action
pair (↑,←) or (→,↓), a collision will occur, which leads to
a -10 punishment for each agent. Otherwise, the reward is
0. Suppose that the agents are in the “coordination state”
as shown in Fig. 4(b). When acting independently in the
environment, the agents learn their single agent optimal Q-
value vectors at state s1 or s2 as Q1(s1, ·) = (−1,−10,−5,−1),
Q2(s2, ·) = (−10,−1,−1,−5). Then the local Q-value matri-
ces of this “coordination state” need to be initialized as
QJ1(~s, ·) = Q1(s1, ·)T × (1,1,1,1)+QCT1 (~s, ·)
=


−1 −1 −11 −1
−10 −10 −10 −10
−5 −5 −5 −5
−1 −11 −1 −1

 ,
QJ2(~s, ·) = (1,1,1,1)T ×Q2(s2, ·)+QCT2 (~s, ·)
=


−10 −1 −11 −5
−10 −1 −1 −5
−10 −1 −1 −5
−10 −11 −1 −5

 .
So the pure strategy Nash equilibria for this joint state are
(up, down) and (right, left). If we initialize the local Q-value
with the way used in [34] or just initialize them to zeros, the
learning process would be much longer.
For the “coordination state” with three agents, the Q-value
QCTi (~s,~a) can be calculated in the same way, except for the
relative positions (∆x1,∆y1,∆x2,∆y2) = (x1 − x2,y1 − y2,x2 −
x3,y2− y3) and the cubic Q-value for each joint state.
1
1
2
2
move right
move right
move left
move left
Collision scenario I:
Collision scenario II:
Fig. 3: Two scenarios of possible collisions.
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5
(a) A 5× 5 blank source task with two agents.
1
2 G1
G2
(b) The detected “coordination states”.
Fig. 4: An example of the local Q-value transfer in a two-agent
system.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To test the presented NegoSI algorithm, several groups of
simulated experiments are implemented and the results are
compared with those of three other state-of-the-art MARL
algorithms, namely, CQ-learning [14], NegoQ with value
function transfer (NegoQ-VFT) [29] and independent learners
with value function transfer (IL-VFT). In next two subsections,
the presented NegoSI algorithm is applied to six grid world
games and an intelligent warehouse problem, which shows
that NegoSI is an effective approach for MARL problems
compared with other existing MARL algorithms.
For all these experiments, each agent has four actions: up,
down, left, right. The reward settings are as follows:
1) When an agent reaches its goal/goals, it receives a
reward of 100. Its final goal is an absorbing state. One
episode is over when all agents reach their goals.
2) A negative reward of -10 is received if a collision
happens or an agent steps out of the border. In these
cases, agents will bounce to their previous states.
3) Otherwise, the reward is set to -1 as the power consump-
tion.
The settings of other parameters are the same for all algo-
rithms: learning rate α = 0.1, discount rate γ = 0.9, exploration
factor ε = 0.01 for ε-greedy strategy. All algorithms run 2000
iterations for the grid world games and 8000 iterations for the
intelligent warehouse problem. We use three typical criteria to
evaluate these MARL algorithms, i.e., steps of each episode
(SEE), rewards of each episode (REE) and average runtime
(AR). All the results are averaged over 50 runs.
A. Tests on grid world games
The proposed NegoSI algorithm is evaluated in the grid
world games presented by Melo and Veloso [13], which are
shown in Fig. 5. The first four benchmarks, i.e., ISR, SUNY,
MIT and PENTAGON (shown as Fig. 5(a)-(d), respectively),
are two-agent games, where the cross symbols denote the
initial locations of each agent and the goals of the other agent.
8In addition, we design two highly competitive games to further
test the algorithms, namely, GW nju (Fig. 5(e)) and GWa3
(Fig. 5(f)). The game GW nju has two agents and the game
GWa3 has three agents. The initial location and the goal of
agent i are represented by the number i and Gi, respectively.
We first examine the performances of the tested algorithms
regarding the SEE (steps of each episode) for each benchmark
map (See Fig. 6). The state-of-the-art value function transfer
mechanism helps NegoQ and ILs to converge fast in all games
except for SUNY. NegoSI also has good convergence char-
acteristics. CQ-learning, however, has a less stable learning
curve especially in PENTAGON, GW nju and GWa3. This
is reasonable since in these highly competitive games, the
agents’ prior-learned optimal policies always have conflicts
and CQ-learning cannot find the equilibrium joint action to
coordinate them. When more collisions occur, the agents are
frequently bounced to previous states and forced to take more
steps before reaching their goals. The learning steps of the
final episode for each algorithm in each benchmark map are
shown in Table I. In ISR, NegoSI converges to 7.48, which
is the closest one to the value obtained by the optimal policy.
In other cases, NegoSI achieves the learning step of the final
episode between 105.1% and 120.4% to the best solution.
(a) ISR (b) SUNY
(c) MIT (d) PENTAGON
1 2G2 G1
(e) GW nju
1,G2 2,G1
3
G3
(f) GWa3
Fig. 5: Grid world games.
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Fig. 6: SEE (steps of each episode) for each tested benchmark map.
Then we analyze the REE (rewards of each episode) cri-
terion of these tested algorithms (See Fig. 7-12). The results
vary for each map. In ISR, NegoSI generally achieves the
highest REE through the whole learning process, which shows
fewer collisions and more cooperations between the learning
agents. Also, the difference between the two agents’ reward
values is small, which reflects the fairness of the learning
process of NegoSI. The agents are more independent in
SUNY. Each of them has three candidates for the single-agent
optimal policy. In this setting, ILVFT has good performance.
NegoSI shows its fairness and high REE value compared
with NegoVFT and CQ-learning. The agents in MIT have
more choices of collision avoidances. All the tested algorithms
obtain the final reward of around 80. However, the learning
curves of CQ-learning are relatively unstable. In PENTAGON,
NegoSI proves its fairness and achieves as good performance
as algorithms do with the value function transfer.
Other than these above benchmarks, we give two highly
competitive games to test the proposed algorithm. In both
games, the agents’ single-agent optimal policies conflict with
TABLE I: The learning steps of the final episode of each tested benchmark map.
ISR SUNY MIT PENTAGON GW n ju GWa3
CQ− learning 8.91 10.70 19.81 15.32 12.65 8.65
ILV FT 13.11 10.38 18.67 14.18 10.94 11.40
NegoQV FT 8.36 12.98 19.81 8.55 10.95 8.31
NegoSI 7.48 10.92 21.29 10.30 12.11 8.87
T he optimal policy 6 10 18 8 10 8
9each other and need appropriate coordination. In GW nju, the
learning curves of NegoSI finally converge to 91.39 and 90.09,
which are very close to the optimal final REE values as 93
and 91, respectively. Similar to NegoSI, NegoVFT achieves the
final REE values of 91.27 and 91.25. However, NegoSI can
negotiate for a fixed and safer policy that allows one agent to
always move greedily and the other to avoid collision (while
NegoVFT cannot), which shows the better coordination ability
of NegoSI. For the three-agent grid world GWa3, even though
NegoSI does not have the lowest SEE, it achieves the highest
REE through the whole learning process. For one thing, this
result demonstrates the scalability of NegoSI in the three-agent
setting. For another, it shows that the agents using NegoSI have
the ability to avoid collisions to obtain more rewards while
the agents using traditional MARL methods have less desire
to coordinate and therefore lose their rewards. Actually, even
though we developed our method with non-cooperative multi-
agent model, it does not necessarily mean that the agents are
egoistic. Thanks to the negotiation mechanism, agents learn
to benefit themselves while doing little harm to others, which
shows an evidence of cooperation.
The results regarding AR (average runtime) are shown in
Table II. ILVFT has the fastest learning speed, which is only
five to ten times slower than Q-learning to learn single policy.
CQ-learning only considers joint states in “coordination state”
and it also has a relatively small computational complexity.
The AR of NegoVFT is five to ten times more than that
of ILVFT. This is reasonable since NegoVFT learns in the
whole joint state-action space and computes the equilibrium
for each joint state. The learning speed of NegoSI is slower
than CQ-learning but faster than NegoVFT. Even if NegoSI
adopts the sparse-interaction based learning framework and
has computational complexity similar to CQ-learning, it needs
to search for the equilibrium joint action in the “coordination
state”, which slows down the learning process.
B. A real-world application: intelligent warehouse systems
MARL has been widely used in such simulated domains
as grid worlds [1], but few applications have been found for
Picking staon
Storage shelves
Robot
Fig. 13: Simulation platform of the intelligent warehouse system.
realistic problems comparing to single-agent RL algorithms
[36]-[39] or MAS algorithms [40]-[42]. In this paper, we apply
the proposed NegoSI algorithm to an intelligent warehouse
problem. Previously, single agent path planning methods have
been successfully used in complex systems [43] [44], however,
the intelligent warehouse employs a team of mobile robots
to transport objects and single-agent path planning methods
frequently cause collisions [45]. So we solve the multi-agent
coordination problem in a learning way.
The intelligent warehouse is made up of three parts: picking
stations, robots and storage shelves (shown as in Fig. 13).
There are generally four steps of the order fulfillment process
for intelligent warehouse systems:
1) Input and decomposition: input and decompose orders
into separated tasks;
2) Task allocation: the central controller allocates the tasks
to corresponding robots using task allocation algorithms
(e.g., the Auction method);
3) Path planning: robots plan their transportation paths with
a single-agent path planning algorithm;
4) Transportation and collision avoidance: robots transport
their target storage shelves to the picking station and
then bring them back to their initial positions. During
the transportation process, robots use sensors to detect
shelves and other robots to avoid collisions.
We focus on solving the multi-robot path planning and
collision avoidance in a MARL way and ignore the first two
steps of the order fulfillment process by requiring each robot
to finish a certain number of random tasks. The simulation
platform of an intelligent warehouse system is shown as in
Fig. 13, which is a 16× 21 grid environment and each grid
is of size 0.5m×0.5m in real world. Shaded grids are storage
shelves which cannot be passed through. The state space of
each robot is made up of two parts: the location and the task
number. Each robot has 4 actions, namely, “up”, “down”, “left”
and “right”.
We only compare the NegoSI algorithm with CQ-learning
for the intelligent warehouse problem. In fact, ILVFT has no
guarantee of the convergence characteristics and it is difficult
to converge in the intelligent warehouse setting in practice.
NegoVFT is also infeasible since its internal memory cost in
MATLAB is estimated to be 208×208×208×10×10×10×
4×4×4×8B= 4291GB, while the costs of other algorithms
are about 2 MB. Like NegoVFT, other MG-based MARL
algorithms cannot solve the intelligent warehouse problem
either. Experiments were performed in 2-agent and 3-agent
settings, respectively, and the results are shown as in Fig. 14
and Fig. 15.
In the 2-agent setting, the initial position and final goal of
robot 1 are (1,1) and those of robot 2 are (1,16). Each robot
needs to finish 30 randomly assigned tasks. The task set is the
same for all algorithms. Robots with NegoSI achieve lower
SEE (steps of each episode) than robots with CQ-learning
throughout the whole learning process (as shown in Fig.
14). NegoSI finally converges to 449.9 steps and CQ-learning
converges to 456.9 steps. In addition, robots with NegoSI have
higher and more stable REE (rewards of each episode). Finally,
the average runtime for completing all the tasks is 2227s for
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Fig. 7: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in ISR.
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Fig. 8: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in SUNY.
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Fig. 9: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in MIT.
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Fig. 10: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in PENTAGON.
0 5 10 15 20
70
75
80
85
90
95
episodes (×100)
re
w
a
rd
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
Agent 1
Agent 2
(a) CQ-learning
0 5 10 15 20
70
75
80
85
90
95
episodes (×100)
re
w
a
rd
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
Agent 1
Agent 2
(b) ILVFT
0 5 10 15 20
70
75
80
85
90
95
episodes (×100)
re
w
a
rd
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
Agent 1
Agent 2
(c) NegoQVFT
0 5 10 15 20
70
75
80
85
90
95
episodes (×100)
re
w
a
rd
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
Agent 1
Agent 2
(d) NegoSI
Fig. 11: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in GW nju.
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Fig. 12: REE (rewards of each episode) for each tested algorithm in GWa3.
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TABLE II: Average runtime for each tested map.
ISR SUNY MIT PENTAGON GW n ju GWa3
CQ− learning 8.54 5.91 13.68 8.52 5.07 5.95
ILV FT 4.91 4.14 9.78 6.56 2.53 7.21
NegoQV FT 13.92 20.18 36.84 18.45 21.89 50.48
NegoSI 16.74 7.33 19.58 16.18 7.08 16.41
QL f or Single Policy 0.51 0.45 1.29 0.05 0.19 0.07
NegoSI and is 3606s for CQ-learning. Robots used 38% less
time to complete all the tasks with NegoSI than that with CQ-
learning.
The performances of NegoSI are also better in the 3-agent
setting than that of CQ-learning. The initial position and the
final goal of different robots are (1,1), (1,8) and (1,16). Each
robot needs to finish 10 randomly assigned tasks. The task
set is the same for different algorithms. SEE (steps of each
episode) for robots with NegoSI finally converges to 168.7
steps and that for robots with CQ-learning converges to 177.3
steps (as shown in Fig. 15). In addition, the learning curves
of NegoSI are more stable. Robots with NegoSI have higher
and more stable REE (rewards of each episode). Finally, the
average runtime for completing all the tasks is 1352s for
NegoSI and 2814s for CQ-learning. The robots use 52% less
time to complete all the tasks with NegoSI than that with CQ-
learning.
Remark 4: The agents with CQ-learning algorithm learn
faster than the agents with NegoSI for the benchmark maps
in Section IV-A, but slower than those with NegoSI for the
intelligent warehouse problem in Section IV-B. The reason is
that for agents with CQ-learning, the number of “coordination
state” is several times higher than that with NegoSI. This
difference becomes significant with the increase of the task
number, the environment scale and the number of agents. Thus,
the time used to search for one specific “coordination state” in
the “coordination state” pool increases faster in CQ-learning
than in NegoSI, which results in the increase of the whole
learning time. According to all these experimental results,
the presented NegoSI algorithm maintains better performances
regarding such characteristics as coordination ability, conver-
gence, scalability and computational complexity, especially for
practical problems.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a negotiation-based MARL algorithm with
sparse interactions (NegoSI) is proposed for the learning
and coordination problems in multi-agent systems. In this
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Fig. 14: SEE (steps of each episode) and REE (rewards of each episode) for NegoSI and CQ-learning in the 2-agent intelligent warehouse.
0 20 40 60 80
150
200
250
300
episodes (×100)
st
ep
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
NegoSI
CQlearning
(a) SEE
0 20 40 60 80
650
700
750
800
850
900
episodes (×100)
re
w
a
rd
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ep
iso
de
 
 
NegoSI agent1
NegoSI agent2
NegoSI agent3
CQlearning agent1
CQlearning agent2
CQlearning agent3
(b) REE
Fig. 15: SEE (steps of each episode) and REE (rewards of each episode) for NegoSI and CQ-learning in the 3-agent intelligent warehouse.
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integrated algorithm the knowledge transfer mechanism is
also adopted to improve agent’s learning speed and coordina-
tion ability. In contrast to traditional sparse-interaction based
MARL algorithms, NegoSI adopts the equilibrium concept
and makes it possible for agents to select non-strict EDSP
or Meta equilibrium for their joint actions, which makes it
easy to find near optimal (or even optimal) policy and to
avoid collisions as well. The experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness of the presented NegoSI algorithm regarding
such characteristics as fast convergence, low computational
complexity and high scalability in comparison to the state-of-
the-art MARL algorithms, especially for practical problems.
Our future work focuses on further comparison of NegoSI
with other existing MARL algorithms and more applications
of MARL algorithms to general and realistic problems. In
addition, multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) [46]-
[48] will also be considered to further combine environment
information and coordination knowledge for local learning.
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